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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 30, I.U.O.E., AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5792 
HUDSON RIVER PARK TRUST, 
Employer. 
ARCHER, BYINGTON, GLENNON & LEVINE, LLP (MARTY GLENNON, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Petitioner 
LAURIE SILBERFELD, GENERAL COUNSEL, for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On March 12, 2008, the Local 30, I.U.O.E., AFL-CIO (petitioner) filed, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a 
timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of certain employees 
of the Hudson River Park Trust (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
thatthe following negotiating unit was appropriate: ..._ 
Included: All regular full-time Horticulturist, Assistant Director of 
Maintenance, Maintenance Technicians, Mechanic, Motor Pool 
Specialist, Chief Facility Engineer and Facility Maintenance 
Technician. 
Excluded: All other employees, including seasonals. 
Case No. C-5792 -2-
Pursuantto that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on June 3, 2008, 
at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 3, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Robert S.'Hite, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF 
GREATER NEW YORK, LOCAL 100, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-27600 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
EDWARD PICHARDO, ESQ., for Charging Party 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, GENERAL COUNSEL AND VICE PRESIDENT 
(ROBERT K. DRINAN and MICHELLE L. SHERIDAN of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Transport Workers 
Union of Greater New York, Local 100 (TWU) to a decision by the Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge, as amended, alleging that the New York City Transit 
Authority (NYCTA) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it unilaterally implemented a uniform requirement for the title of Revenue 
Equipment Maintainer (REM) in the TWU bargaining unit and when it failed to negotiate 
with TWU the subject of providing REM employees with bullet proof vests.1 
1
 41 PERB U4503 (2008). 
Case No. U-27600 -2-
The ALJ dismissed TWU's allegation that NYCTA violated the Act by unilaterally 
imposing the uniform requirement based on NYCTA's duty satisfaction defense. With 
respect to the portion of the charge alleging a failure to negotiate bullet proof vests for 
REM employees, the ALJ concluded that TWU abandoned the claim by failing to 
address the issue in its post-hearing brief. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, TWU contends that the ALJ erred in finding merit to NYCTA's 
duty satisfaction defense arguing that the ALJ misinterpreted the parties' agreement. In 
addition, TWU asserts that the ALJ erred in concluding that TWU abandoned its claim 
with respect to the bullet proof vests. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm, in part, and reverse in part, the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
At the scheduled hearing, the case was submitted to the ALJ on a stipulated 
record. The stipulated record is limited to the pleadings, correspondence between the 
parties and other documents including portions of the 2002 collectively negotiated 
agreement (agreement) between NYCTA and TWU, portions of the parties' 1966 
agreement and a 1968 memorandum and supplementary letter describing changes to 
working conditions for hourly rate employees.2 No evidence was presented with respect 
to the parties' history of negotiations. 
2
 Due to the sparsity of the record, certain facts have been discerned from admissions 
contained in the pleadings. ALJ Exhibit 3, Appendix, ffl|10-14; ALJ Exhibit 4,1fflil-14. 
Case No. U-2/60U -6-
TWU represents a bargaining unit that includes the title of REM. At times, REM 
employees work with employees in the title of Collecting Agents (CA) who are armed 
and wear bullet proof vests. A CA is present when a REM services Metrocard vending 
machines. 
Article VI(C) of the parties' 1966 agreement states: 
Effective January 1, 1966, where the Authority requires an 
employee subject to the terms of this agreement to be in 
uniform, the Authority will supply such uniform. 
The 1968 supplementary letter states: 
The Authority will require employees in the title of Railroad 
Watchman to be in uniform as soon as is practicable. 
Article II of the 2002 agreement contains various general provisions including 
§2.18 which states: 
Where the Transit Authority requires an employee covered 
by this Agreement to be in uniform, the Transit Authority will 
supply such uniform. 
In addition, §4.4 of the agreement includes specific provisions applicable to REM 
employees with respect to safety equipment, tools, foul weather gear and work shoe 
benefits. Subsection 4.4(L), the applicable provision with respect to REM safety 
equipment, states: 
1. Employees shall be provided, without cost to 
themselves, with such safety equipment as may be 
authorized by the Head of the Department. 
2. Revenue Equipment Maintainers assigned to Rapid 
shall be provided with prescription safety glasses. 
The Transit Authority reserves the rinht to stric-t!v 
enforce the safety rules and Revenue Equipment 
Maintainers failing to wear safety glasses as required 
shall be subject to loss of differential pay in addition to 
disciplinary action. The Union agrees to cooperate 
Case No. U-2/6U0 -4-
with the Transit Authority in seeing that safety rules 
are observed. 
3. One (1) employee, designated by the Union shall be 
permitted to attend each regular local safety 
committee meeting, conducted normally once (1) a 
month by supervision, without loss of pay for such 
attendance. At the time of designation the Union shall 
state which local meeting the designated employee 
shall attend. 
In 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2007, NYCTA and TWU exchanged a series of letters 
with respect to NYCTA's intention to mandate that REM employees wear a uniform. 
Several such letters were included in the stipulated record. In its letters, TWU opposed 
the uniform plan for various reasons and asserted that a requirement obligating REM 
employees to wear a uniform constitutes a mandatory subject of negotiations. In 
contrast, NYCTA's letters stated that §2.18 of the 2002 agreement grants it the authority 
to require ernployees to wear uniforms so long as it supplies the uniforms. In a letter, 
dated March 21, 2003, from NYCTA to TWU, NYCTA offered to meet with TWU to 
discuss styles and materials for the uniforms being considered for REMs. On May 16, 
2003, TWU wrote back stating that "failure to negotiate concerning impact is an 
improper practice" (emphasis added), and challenging NYCTA's right to unilaterally 
impose a uniform requirement on REMs. In a follow-up letter from NYCTA to TWU, 
dated June 23, 2003, NYCTA described the parties' practices under §2.18 in the 
following manner: 
As you know, Section 2.18 of our collective bargaining 
agreement gives New York City Transit the right to require 
employees to be in uniform so long as Transit supplies such 
uniforms. In exercising that right, Transit has, in the past, 
sought input from the Transport Workers Union. In fact, the 
uniforms being proposed are comprised of items currently 
being issued to Transit employees in other titles. All such 
Case No. U-27600 -5-
items were thoroughly discussed with the TWU over the 
course of several joint labor-management uniform committee 
meetings. 
The stipulated record does not include a TWU refutation of NYCTA's description 
of the practice under the contract provision. 
In January 2007, NYCTA informed TWU that NYCTA would be proceeding with 
the distribution of uniforms to REM employees and offered to meet with TWU to discuss 
any issues it may have with respect to the uniforms. 
On March 21, 2007, NYCTA issued Bulletin No. 07-12 announcing to REM 
employees that they will be required to wear NYCTA issued uniforms. The bulletin 
describes the type and amount of uniforms to be provided to each REM employee and 
sets forth instructions for the proper wear and maintenance of the uniforms. 
On April 18, 2007, NYCTA and TWU met to discuss the issue of REM uniforms. 
During the meeting, TWU raised concerns about employee comfort when wearing the 
uniforms in winter and summer. In addition, TWU demanded at the meeting that REMs 
be furnished with bullet proof vests.3 
DISCUSSION 
The ALJ concluded that the NYCTA did not engage in unilateral action with 
respect to a mandatory subject in violation of §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it imposed a 
uniform requirement on REM employees because it had satisfied its duty to bargain the 
subject in §2:18 of the agreement. We agree. 
The Board has held that where an employer and employee organization have 
bargained a specific subject to completion and have reached an agreement with respect 
3
 No further facts about the parties' discussions at the meeting are contained in the 
record. 
Case No. U-2/5U0 - f c j -
to that subject, the employer has satisfied its duty to negotiate and, therefore, cannot 
act unilaterally in violation of the Act when it takes an action permitted under the 
specifically negotiated term of the agreement.4 Similarly, a party may unilaterally end a 
past practice, without violating the Act, by reverting to the terms of a specifically 
negotiated provision.5 The burden rests with a respondent to plead and prove a duty 
satisfaction or contract reversion defense through negotiated terms that are reasonably 
clear on the specific subject at issue.6 
In Town of Shawangunk7 the Board emphasized that: 
Just as the standards for waiver have been formulated in a 
way that guards against an improvident loss of bargaining 
right, so also must the standards for duty satisfaction be 
shaped to avoid too ready a finding that bargaining 
obligations have been fulfilled. A satisfaction of the duty to 
negotiate necessitates record evidence of facts establishing 
that the parties negotiated an agreement upon terms which 
are reasonably clear on the subject presented to us for 
4
 County of Nassau, 31 PERB 1J3064 (1998); County of Nassau, 31 PERB 1J3074 
(1998); State of New York (Workers Compensation Board), 32 PERB 1J3076 (1999). 
See also, Roma v Ruffo, 92 NY2d 489 (1998). 
5
 State of New York-Unified Court System, 26 PERB ^3013(1993). 
6
 NYCTA, 20 PERB 1J3037 (1987), confd, NYCTA v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 
147 AD2d 574, 22 PERB 1J7001 (2d Dept 1989); Town of Shawangunk, 32 PERB 1J3042 
(1999). We note that §205.5(d) of the Act denies PERB authority to enforce a 
collectively negotiated agreement, and declares that it "shall not exercise jurisdiction 
over an alleged violation of such an agreement that would not otherwise constitute an 
improper... practice." This provision does not, however, prohibit us from interpreting an 
agreement to determine, inter alia, whether it contains a waiver of a charging party's 
rightto negotiate or a satisfaction of the respondent's duty to negotiate.: CSEAv 
Newman, 88 AD2d 685, 15 PERB 1J7011 (3d Dept 1982), app dismissed, 57 NY2d 775, 
15 PERB 1J7020 (1982) affd, 61 NY2d 1001, 17 PERB 1J7007 (1984) (subsequent 
history omitted). See also, County of Saratoga and Saratoga County Sheriff, 37 PERB 
1J3024 (2004) rev, County of Saratoga v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 21 AD3d 
1160, 38 PERB1J7013 (3d Dept 2005). 
7
 Supra, note 6, 32 PERB at 3094-3095. 
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decision. We reject any lesser standard for it would 
compromise the right and duty to negotiate and the public 
policies underlying the creation of that right and duty. 
When determining whether parties have, in fact, negotiated an at-issue subject to 
completion, we apply standard principles of contract interpretation.8 Such principles are 
applicable whenever the interpretation of an agreement is necessary for the resolution 
of the merits of an improper practicacharge.9 In construing an agreement, our focus is 
aimed at discerning the parties' intent by giving a practical interpretation to the language 
utilized. If, as here, the contract language is reasonably clear but/nevertheless, 
susceptible to more than one interpretation, extrinsic evidence, such as negotiation 
history and/or a past practice, is admissible to determine the intent of the parties. But, 
were the contract language clear and unambiguous, consideration of evidence outside 
the four corners of the agreement would be inappropriate. 
In the present case, we reverse the ALJ's finding that §2.18 of the agreement 
constitutes an unambiguous grant of authority to NYCTA to unilaterally require 
employees to wear a specific uniform in exchange for NYCTA providing the uniform. 
Although we agree that the first clause in §2.18 unambigiously grants NYCTA the 
right to require employees to wear a uniform, we conclude that on its face the second 
clause in §2.18, "the Transit Authority will supply such uniform", is susceptible to more 
than one reasonable interpretation: it can be construed either as granting NYCTA the 
right to select the particular uniform to 
for a uniform, or both. A comparison of §§2.18 and 4.4(L)(1), the latter section being 
8
 County of Livingston, 30 PERB 1J3046 (1997). See also, Bornstein, Gosline, 
Greenbaum, Labor and Employment Arbitration, 2d ed, Ch. 9 (2008) 
^County of Saratoga v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, supra, note 5. 
uase NO. u-^/t>uu -«-
applicable to NYCTA providing safety equipment to REMs, does not resolve the 
ambiguity in §2.18. 
Therefore, in order to properly construe the parties' intent, we turn to parol 
evidence in the record. The stipulated record does not contain specific negotiations 
history with respect to §2.18 of the agreement other than it is an apparent derivation 
from a provision in the parties' 1966 agreement. The record does include NYCTA's 
unrebutted description of the parties' practice under §2.18 in which NYCTA selects the 
uniform after discussions with TWU. This practice constitutes persuasive parol 
evidence that §2.18 constitutes a specifically negotiated term with respect to uniforms 
that satisfies NYCTA's obligation to negotiate the subject under the Act.10 Therefore, 
although certain aspects of a decision to impose a uniform requirement are mandatorily 
negotiable11 we find that NYCTA has satisfied its statutory duty to negotiate the 
decision. 
The fact that NYCTA satisfied its duty to negotiate the subject does not preclude 
TWU from demanding to negotiate the impact of the decision. However, the duty to 
negotiate impact arises only upon a valid request,12 and it does not forestall employer 
10
 TWU's reliance on the 1968 supplemental letter regarding railroad watchmen is 
misplaced. The letter, without additional evidence about its context, does not shed light 
on the meaning of §2.18. In addition, we note that in TWU's brief it makes refererence 
to what it describes as the parties "traditional interpretation" of §2.18. However, there is 
nothing in the record that supports that conclusory statement. 
11
 See, County of Onondaga and Countu of Qnondana Sheriff, 14 PERB j[3Q29 M981\ 
City of Buffalo, 15 PERB P027 (1982); A/ew York State Canal Corp, 30 PERB u W u " 
(1997). 
12
 City of Rochester, 17 PERB U3082 (1984). 
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action.13 Upon our review of the record, we conclude that TWU did not allege in its 
improper practice charge that it demanded impact negotiations over NYCTA's decision 
and/or that NYCTA refused to engage in impact negotiations. Even if TWU's pleading is 
construed differently, TWU's May 16, 2003 letter, which makes a general reference to 
the duty to negotiate impact under the Act, does not constitute a demand for impact 
negotiations.14 In fact, TWU's subsequent letters clearly show that it sought to negotiate 
the decision to require uniforms for REMs. 
We next turn to TWU's exception challenging the ALJ's dismissal of the charge 
as it relates to bullet proof vests. The ALJ dismissed that portion of the charge on the 
grounds that TWU had abandoned its claim by failing to address the claim in its post-
hearing brief. 
Pursuant to §212.5 of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules), the filing of post-
hearing briefs containing proposed statements of facts and conclusions of law is at a 
party's discretion unless ordered by the ALJ. The mere fact that TWU did not fully 
address the issue of bullet proof vests in its post-hearing brief does not establish an 
intention by TWU to abandon its claim. In reaching our conclusion, we note that the 
ALJ did not direct the parties to brief the issue.15 Therefore, we reverse and remand the 
13
 Town of Oyster Bay, 12 PERB1J3086 (1979). 
14
 See, Lackawanna City Sen Dist, 28 PERB 1J3023 (1995); County of Suffolk and 
Sheriff of Suffolk County, 29 PERB j[3002 (1996); NYS Office of Court Administration, 
32 PERB P063 (1999). 
15
 In City of New York, 40 PERB fi3017 (2007), the Board held that under certain 
circumstances, the subject of bullet proof vests may constitute a mandatory subject of 
negotiations. 
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charge to the ALJ to examine the merits of TWU's claim with respect to bullet proof 
vests.16 
Based on the foregoing, we grant TWU's exceptions in part, reverse the decision 
of the ALJ and remand the case. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the improper practice charge is dismissed 
except to the extent that it alleges that NYCTA violated §209-a. 1(d) of the Act by failing 
to negotiate the subject of bullet proof vests for REMs, which is reinstated, and the 
matter is remanded for further processing with respect to that allegation only. 
DATED: July 3, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefk^witz, Ch«rihVan 
Robert S. Hfte, Member 
16
 A remand in this case is necessitated by the fact that NYCTA did not plead a duty 
satisfaction defense with respect to the issue of bullet proof vests based on §4.4(L) of 
the 2002 agreement. 
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HONEOYE FALLS-LIMA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
and HONEOYE FALLS-LIMA EDUCATION 
ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
Respondents. 
) BERNICE MALCOLM, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Bernice Malcolm (Malcolm) 
from decisions of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) dismissing three improper practice charges, as amended, Case Nos. U-28121, 
U-28122 and U-28123, alleging that the Honeoye Falls-Lima Central School District 
(District) violated §§209-a.1(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) and that the Hdneoye Falls-Lima Education Association, NYSUT 
(Association) violated §§209-a.2(a), (b) and (c) of the Act. 
After the Director granted Malcolm the opportunity to amend each of her charges 
to correct certain deficiencies, the Director dismissed the amended charges finding that 
Case NOS. U-28121, U-28122 & U-28123 -2-
each charge failed to allege facts that, as a matter of law, constitute violations of the 
Act. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In her exceptions, Malcolm contends that the Director erred in dismissing the 
charges on the grounds that each charge alleges that: a) the Association failed to file 
improper practice charges on her behalf; b) violations of a collectively negotiated 
agreement constitute improper practices under the Act; and c) other unspecified facts 
support her allegations. In addition, Malcolm asserts that all three charges are timely. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of Malcolm's 
arguments, we must dismiss her exceptions as untimely. 
DISCUSSION 
Pursuant to §213.2(a) of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules), within 15 working 
) • • . . . • • 
days after receipt of a decision, a party may file exceptions with the Board. The Rule 
requires the party filing exceptions to submit proof of service to the Board demonstrating 
that the exceptions were also served on all other parties within the same 15 working day 
period. 
Based on our review of the record, the evidence establishes that the District and 
the Association were not served with the exceptions within the time period required 
under the Rules. The Director issued his decisions on March 25, 2008 and Malcolm 
received thei decisions oilI April 5, 2008; On April 21, 2008, the Board received 
Malcolm's exceptions, dated April 15, 2008, without proof of service on the District and 
the Association, as required by §213.2(a) of the Rules. 
On May 7, 2008, the Board sent Malcolm a letter requesting that she submit to 
the Board proof of service of her exceptions on the other parties. On May 13, 2008, 
Case NOS. U-28121, U-ZtiVZZ & \J-ZV\Z6 -3-
Malcolm submitted documentation to the Board demonstrating that on May 10, 2008 
she made a mailing to the District and the Association by certified mail, return receipt 
requested.1 
Consistent with the Rules, the Board has held that timely service of exceptions 
upon all other parties constitutes a necessary component for the timely filing of 
exceptions.2 In the present case, Malcolm failed to serve her exceptions on the District 
and the Association within 15 working days of her receipt of the Director's decisions; 
therefore, Malcolm's exceptions are untimely and they must be dismissed. Based on 
the foregoing, we need not reach the merits of the exceptions. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the exceptions are hereby dismissed in 
their entirety. 
DATED: July 3, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowjj^, phairmafi 
/jJuJ/J)LJ!r. 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
alcolm's proof of service does not indicate what she mailed to the District and 
Association. For purposes of this decision, we will assume that she mailed to the other 
parties copies of her exceptions. 
2
 Town/City of Poughkeepsie Water Treatment Facility, 35 PERB 1J3037 (2002); 
Yonkers Fedn of Teachers (Jackson), 36 PERB P050 (2003). See also, Catskill 
Regional OTB, 14 PERB 1J3075 (1981)(subsequent history omitted). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RONALD GRASSEL, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - - -
CASE NO. U-28124 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
RONALD GRASSEL, pro se 
DAVID BRODSKY, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS (RUSSELL J. 
PLATZEK, of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on a motion filed by Ronald Grassel (Grassel) 
seeking leave to file exceptions, pursuant to §§212.4(h) and 213 of the Rules of 
Procedure (Rules), for the disqualification of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) with 
respect to an improper practice charge, dated June 22, 2007, alleging that the Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of New York (District) violated §§209-
a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
The District filed an answer to the charge denying that it violated the Act and 
raising various affirmative defenses. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On April 15, 2008, the parties were notified that a hearing with respect to the 
case NO. u-^oiZ4 -z-
improper practice charge would take place before an ALJ on June 13, 2008. 
Immediately prior to the commencement of the hearing on June 13, 2008, the ALJ 
engaged in off-the-record discussions with the parties about documents that would be 
received into evidence as ALJ exhibits as well as clarification as to the allegations of the 
improper practice charge. Following those off-the-reGord discussions, the hearing 
commenced with the ALJ placing twelve ALJ exhibits into evidence. Thereafter, there 
was a colloquy between the ALJ and the parties with respect to the substantive nature 
of the allegations contained in the improper practice charge. Following the colloquy, the 
ALJ granted a District request for leave to file a motion to dismiss the charge and the 
hearing was adjourned. 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE EXCEPTIONS 
On June 13, 2008, Grassel filed a motion for leave to file exceptions with the 
) 
Board simultaneously with a motion filed with the ALJ requesting that the ALJ recuse 
himself, pursuant to §212.4(g) of the Rules, from hearing the improper practice charge. 
Both motions contain similar allegations about purported conduct of the ALJ during the 
off-the-record discussions with the parties prior to the hearing. Following receipt of the 
recusal motion, the ALJ granted the District until July 2, 2008 to respond to Grassel's 
motion. The motion for recusal remains pending before the ALJ. 
DISCUSSION 
It is; well-settled that the Board will grant leave tofile interlocutory exceptions to 
non-final rulings and decisions, pursuant to §212.4 of the Rules, in situations where the 
moving party demonstrates extraordinary circumstances.1 In the present case, Grassel's 
•; 1 State of New York (Division of Parole), 40 PERB 1J3007 (2007); UFT (Grassel), 
32PERBH3071 (1999). 
uase NO. u-z»i^4 -d-
motion for leave to file exceptions fails to identify a non-final ruling or decision by the 
ALJ that he seeks to have reviewed. In fact, the motion is premature because the ALJ 
has not yet ruled on the motion for recusal. Finally, the motion fails to demonstrate 
extraordinary circumstances that would warrant the granting of leave to file exceptions. 
WE, THEREFORE, ORDER that the.motion seeking leave to file 
exceptions must be, and hereby is, denied in its entirety. 
DATED: July 3, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Robert &. Hite, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
LOCAL 118, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5744 
TOWN OF SODUS, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Local 118 has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5744 - 2 -
Included: Full and part-time Motor Equipment Operators in the Town's 
highway department. 
Excluded: Town Highway Superintendent and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 118. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 3, 2008 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkcwitz, Oairman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
